Afghanistan: The Scenario at the end of 19th century

Afghanistan: The Scenario At The End of 19th Century

Various scholars and historians have offered the view that Afghanistan was the focal point of ‘The Great Game’ being played between Russia and Britain in the late 19th century. This great game was ostensibly to prevent a Russian invasion of British territories. However, Malcolm Yapp has pointed out that the Britons used the term ‘The Great Game’ in late 1800s to describe several different things in relation to their interest in Asia. Moreover he argues the meaning of the ‘Great-Game’ which is currently popular with the historians does not reflect the real concerns of the British in relation to India in the 19th century. Yapp believes that the primary concern of the British authorities in India was the control of the indigenous population, and not preventing a Russian invasion. Examining the documents of this period ‘one is struck by both the prominence and the unreality of the strategic debates’. These debates he argues in fact obscure and cover up the challenge of internal control of India.

The challenge of internal control I am going to argue, stemmed from the nature of diverse regional polities which had developed in India. As the Chicago school historians have pointed out, these polities drew upon the resources of kinship & lineage societies which pre-dated the Mughal imperial structure. If we look at the structures of institutions of these societies (e.g. Punjab) we find a commonality in their basic assumptions transcending boundaries of Jammu& Kashmir and in of Afghanistan. There is plenty of evidence for the interrelationship between these Tribes in terms of alliances and wars. You had Afghan adventurers like Ahmed Shah Abdali forging right into the territories of Punjab. Similarly within the courts of Mughals and others there was an important component of Afghan nobility.

Various historians have drawn attention to institutions amongst these tribes which are best labeled pre-territorial. Indu Banga has described amongst the tribes of Punjab institutions like Rakhi which supplied the tribes ‘the idea of conquest before conquest’. Levies of Rakhi which basically meant a protection rent were on produce with the caveat that these were for the protection of the cultivators and not for acquiring of their territories. Territories may or may not be acquired but the crucial conceptions were of protection, of keeping up the status of both the protector and the protected. Similarly amongst Afghans these crucial markers of status were important. Keeping the nose in Afghanistan i.e. Puzu or Pozu was a crucial determinant in the relationships between the protectors and protected as Elphinstone has pointed out. Similarly for a host of other practices the notion of territory had not yet evolved in the modern sense.

The British who interfaced with the Indian and Afghan tribes in the 19th century however came with an evolved notion of territory. For them conquest meant setting up areas of delimitation rather there rights to produce or other products of land. Witness the number of delimitation commissions they set up in the 19th century. Controlling the indigenous population meant subjugating the pastoral, nomadic or mobile nature of the tribes in question and settling them down to definite territorial occupations like cultivation as Neeladri Bhattacharya has pointed out. However the presence of the tribal, nomadic and mobile groups did present an area of incomprehensibility. In the areas they could not subjugate they set up treaties and agreements with collectives of tribes. These treaties are at once witness to addressing to the territorial security concerns of the British as well as agreements of defence (non-territorial) of the tribals of the region spanning Punjab, Jammu& Kashmir, North West Frontier Province and Afghanistan.

To a certain extent the great game which received so much of strategic attention in Russian context when seen on the ground actually translates into these concerns of securing the local population. Treaties Engagements Sanads, a document of agreements with various tribal chiefs compiled by C.U. Aitchison actually testifies to the concerns regarding local indigenous population, keeping lines of communication like telegraph going through the areas which these tribes inhabit and securing boundary markers – the famous delimitation exercises carried on by the British.

Let me illustrate with a few examples from the document:

An agreement dated 14th January 1902, (P. 162 of Aitchison) is regarding payment of Tirni ie. the grazing tax. A definite delimitation exercise which subject the Suleman Khel tribes in the North West Frontier Province (Derajat) to certain definite territorial rules. By this they bound themselves to the British for:
paying a grazing tax in future both in the Zhob district and in the Wazristan district at rates which are fixed now at per head of the cattle. For example male camels 8 annas per head and female camel one rupee per head.

However, here concerns of how they would be viewed by other tribes for this act of delimitation also comes in. The agreement quotes “we hold ourselves responsible for the collection of the grazing tax with the assistance of the Govt. when necessary. We can however agree to this on the understanding that grazing tax at the same rates be taken from the Dottanis, who graze alongside us within the Waziristan limits. Otherwise, we shall disgraced in the eyes of the other Ghilzais”.

Thus the contract or agreement of territoriality incorporates the concerns of status. Suleman Khels will pay the tax at the same rates as the Dottanis or otherwise they will be disgraced. This concern is addressed to the British Government. Thus the British Government instead of operating on rule of law is ask to satisfy concerns of status and there by bring it as a criteria of governance. Thus a tribal criteria is brought to the fore.

Similarly in an agreement dated 20th February 1872, with the Dour tribe of the Derajat Frontier “That for due fulfillment of the above conditions (of behavior and crime) of this agreement we the people of entire tribe, unitedly and severally hold ourselves responsible for our own distinct clan, and if we fail, British government is authorized to lay an embargo on the property of the each faction and to impose punishment on our tribe according to the Frontiers Rules as is done with other tribes”. Moreover in order to testify the “ Free-Will and sincerity with which we have made this agreement, the following men respectable Maliks, British subjects and also Maliks of independent territory who frequent British territory are given as securities to have above named conditions fully carried out”.

So here again in a territorial contract the tribal notions of clan as responsible unit or security of individual men as in tribal practices is given to formalize a territorial agreement.

The Aitchison volume has similarly many agreements testifying to the tribal concerns which have crept into concrete territorial agreements of the British. The Great Game here seems to be addressing these concerns in the notions of territoriality of the British. The strategic debate around the threat of Russian invasion actually masks a number of these agreements effected on the ground. The Russian ‘outsider’ then coincides with the mythical outsider of the tribes against which territorial and tribal security is ensured by these agreements.